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ABSTRACT  
Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET) is a collection of mobile nodes that can communicate with each other 
using multihop wireless links without requiring any fixed based-station infrastructure and centralized 
management. Each node in the network acts as both a host and a router. In such scenario, designing of 
an efficient, reliable and secure routing protocol has been a major challenging issue over the last many 
years. Numerous schemes have been proposed for secure routing protocols and most of the research work 
has so far focused on providing security for routing using cryptography. In this paper, we propose a 
novel approach to secure Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol from the insider 
attacks launched through active forging of its Route Reply (RREP) control message. AODV routing    
protocol does not have any security provision that makes it less reliable in publicly open ad hoc network. 
To deal with the concerned security attacks, we have proposed AODV Security Extension (AODVSEC) 
which enhances the scope of AODV for the security provision. We have compared AODVSEC with AODV 
and Secure AODV (SAODV) in normal situation as well as in presence of the three concerned attacks viz. 
Resource Consumption (RC) attack, Route Disturb (RD) attack, Route Invasion (RI) attack and Blackhole 
(BH) attack. To evaluate the performances, we have considered Packet Delivery Fraction (PDF),         
Average End-to-End Delay (AED), Average Throughput (AT), Normalized Routing Load (NRL) and    
Average Jitter and Accumulated Average Processing Time. 
KEYWORDS 
AODV; SAODV; RREQ-ACK Cache; RC; RD; RI; BH ; NS-2.33; PDF; NRL; AED; AT; Jitter;            
Accumulated Average Processing Time 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET) is a collection of mobile nodes which establish a network 
spontaneously and communicate over a shared wireless channel without any pre-deployed      
infrastructure and mostly decentralized management [1]. In an ad hoc network, security is      
became a key requirement now a days. As the communication is done via shared wireless     
media, it is highly vulnerable to many security threats. In this particular case, security can be 
thought for two occurrences viz. Data communication and Routing message relays. Securing 
data communication is very much easy using point-to-point and/or end-to-end security        
techniques, but the major concerns are resided within the security of routing message as these 
messages ultimately form a route to pass the data packets between two ends. Thus, routing    
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protocol itself has to be secured and none of the basic protocols are given with security         
provision. 
In this paper, we have demonstrated Active Forge exploits that are possible against the AODV 
protocol and have offered a secure solution using a simple cache concept to provide security 
from the malevolent nodes. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the fundamental working of 
AODV. Section 3 elaborates the concerned security issues in AODV. Our related study is kept 
in Section 4. Section 5 provides the complete understanding of our proposed approach to    
modify AODV protocol. Section 6 and Section 7 show our Methodology for evaluation and    
results of our Simulation in NS-2.33 along with its Graphs respectively. We have concluded this 
paper in Section 8 followed by the vital references for our research work. 
2. FUNDAMENTAL WORKING OF AODV 
Ad hoc On Demand Distance Vector Routing (AODV) [2]-[3] is a Reactive routing protocols, 
which appear to be more suitable for ad hoc networks, do not maintain up-to-date information 
about the network topology as it is done by the proactive routing protocols like Destination   
Sequenced Distance Vector (DSDV) [4] and Optimized Link State Routing Protocol (OLSR) 
[5], but they create routes on demand. Among reactive routing protocols, the Ad hoc On      
Demand Distance Vector Routing (AODV) is a very popular on demand routing protocol which 
has been developed for MANETs and it is widely use. AODV performance is the best          
considering its ability to maintain connection by periodic exchange of information and we found 
that AODV outperforms other routing protocol and is viable for MANET [6] - [8]. 
As its name suggests, route discovery process is initiated on demand i.e. whenever a particular 
source node wants to start communication with a particular destination and if it is not having the 
corresponding route in its routing table, it initiates route discovery process. Route discovery 
process consists of two control messages viz. Route Request (RREQ) and Route Reply (RREP). 
The source node generates RREQ message at the very first step of the discovery process and 
floods that to its neighborhood. Intermediate node(s) upon having the RREQ message, makes 
reverse route entry for the source node in its routing table and floods the same RREQ packet 
further in the network. 
The ultimate destination node will generate RREP packet in response to the received RREQ 
message and sends that back to the originator of RREQ via unicast property. Before passing the 
received RREP packet towards the source node, intermediate node(s) again updates its routing 
table now for having the destination node’s forwarding entry into it. Thus, Source node can start 
the actual data transmissions after receiving RREP for the concerned destination. Figure 1     
depicts the fundamental working of route discovery process in AODV. 
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Figure 1. Fundamental Working of Route Discovery Pr
One of the very important properties of AODV is that it also allows any intermediate node(s) to 
generate and send RREP towards the source node on behalf of 
is having the fresher route to that destination node. Besides the mentioned two control 
messages, AODV uses one more to maintain the established route as a part of route 
maintenance process in AODV usi
 
3. SECURITY ISSUES WITH 
In any kind of communications, security is considered as an essential requirement for making 
the system much more reliable. For the same purpose, routing protocol in ad hoc networks is the 
most important aspect that has to be secured from possible security threats. Widely used AODV 
routing protocol is also highly vulnerable to many attacks as there is no security provision with 
it and the control messages are dispatched in plain text only. Thus, a
made by forging any of its control me
In this work, we focused on the three perilous active forge attacks through fake RREPs in which 
attacker actively makes use of malignant RREP message by forgi
sequence number and/or hop count to launch the attacks
known pair of source and destination. Following subsections explain the effect of the concerned 
actively forged attacks by fake RRE
3.1. Resource Consumption (RC) Attack
For achieving this particular goal, an attacker uses two fake RREPs and further disturbs the 
route as if it makes a loop in the data path resulting into resource consumption of the 
participating nodes of data path. 
already established.  
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Figure 2. Loop forming attack using two fake RREPs
Figure 2(b) and Figure 2(c) illustrates the fake RREP propagation by the attacker 
node 2 and node 4 respectively. As a result, the victim nodes inside the data loop would be 
forced to consume more energy in continuous data forwarding (see 
3.2. Route Disturb (RD) Attack
The major goal of doing such an attack i
known pair of source and destination. 
Figure 2 (a) is repeated in Figure
position of an attacker. 
Figure 3. 
After finding a route to node-5, as shown in 
RREP to node-5 impersonating a non
table entry for the destination. As a result, the existing route is disturbed (see 
new route discovery process would be e
mmunications (IJCNC) Vol.4, No.4, Ju
 
 
impersonating 
Figure 2(d)). 
 
s to break or disturb the established route between 
Figure 3 shows the consequence of this attack. Above 
 3 (a) for showing the example of an established route and the 
 
Route Disturb attack using a fake RREP 
Figure 3 (b) the attacker generates and sends a fake 
-existing node identity forcing node-5 to change its routing 
Figure
xpected. 
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3.3. Route Invasion (RI) Attack
By means of such an attack, the attacker node invades itself into the existing 
having all data packets pass through it. To achieve this particular goal, the attacker will first find 
a route to reach the victim pair of source and destination. 
invasion attack. Figure 2 (a) is repe
case. 
  
Figure 4. Route Invasion attack using a fake RREP
Figure 4 (b) shows that the attacker node generates and sends a fake RREP to the source node 
forcing it to change its routing entry 
the resultant data path after successful launch of this particular a
3.4. Blackhole (BH) Attack 
In blackhole attack [13]-[14], the malicious node waits for the neighbors to initiate a RREQ
packet. As the node receives the RREQ packet, it immediately sends a false RREP packet with a 
modified higher sequence number. So, that the source node assumes that node is having the 
fresh route towards the destination. The source node ignores the RREP p
other nodes and begins to send the data packets over malicious node. A malicious node takes all 
the routes towards itself. It does not allow forwarding any packet anywhere. This attack is called 
a blackhole as it swallows all data packe
mmunications (IJCNC) Vol.4, No.4, Ju
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Figure 5 shows the Blackhole attack in MANETs in which, source node wants to send data 
packets to a destination node in the network. The attacker replies with false reply RREP having 
higher modified sequence number. So, da
the blackhole instead of the destination.
4. RELATED WORK 
AODV Routing protocol is vulnerable to a wide range of security threats;
attacks [9]. So, to provide the security and prevent 
proposed numerous techniques as Manel Guerrero Zapata [10
protocol, which uses digital signatures to authenticate non
authenticate the hop-count field in both RREQ and 
ARAN, a routing protocol for ad hoc networks that uses authentication and requires the use of a 
trusted certificate server. In ARAN, every node that fo
message must also sign it, (which is very computing power consuming and causes the size of 
the routing messages to increase at each 
Security –Aware Ad hoc Routing (SAR) protocol which defines the tr
associated with each node, and ensures that a node is prevented from handling a RREQ (Route 
Request) unless it provides the required level. This way, data packets will be sent only through 
trusted nodes, with respect to the define
to AODV using either cryptography or centralized trusted server which consumes the more 
computational time. Our proposed security extension to AODV (AODVSEC) gives the similar 
level of security but with reduced computational time.
5. INTRODUCTION TO AODVSEC
In the basic AODV, there is no reason with any node to reject fake RREPs although it has not 
witnessed the concerned route discovery process for which incoming RREP is given to it. Upon 
receiving that particular message (though it is fake), a node will always check its routing table 
for probable updates. AODVSEC is introduced to secure the protocol from the above explained 
active forge attacks commenced through fake RREP packets. We propose to maintai
containing the important information to validate any incoming RREP packet. As the entries 
inside this cache are created during the fundamental route discovery process i.e. in response to 
the generated RREQ message, we call it as a Route REQe
(RREQ-ACK Cache). 
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5.1. Applicability Statement 
AODVSEC is proposed to secure AODV protocol from the insider attacks launched 
actively forged RREP messages only. The attacker generates the fake RREP by means of
increasing the destination sequence number and/ or decreasing the hop count to forcefully 
update the victim node’s routing table. AODVSEC is not considering the attacks based on the 
fake RREQ message. Moreover, our research work focus especially on network
impersonation would only be done by means of spoofing the IP addresses and not the MAC 
addresses.  
5.2. RREQ-ACK Cache 
The main purpose for defining cache is to validate every incoming RREP packet. Those specific 
fields which help a node to uniquely identify the expected RREP in response to the witnessed 
RREQ message for the specific pair of source and destination were desired to be in cache. 
Therefore, we have used the immutable unique fields of route di
IP Address and RREQ Timestamp to copy into at the specific position in the cache. Thus, this 
information has to be collected from all those neighbors along with their identity at which the 
current RREQ message was accepted and further pr
We have used the re-flooded message by the neighbor to populate the Cache. Thus, before 
dropping the duplicated message, a node would be having its cache entry at the time of route 
discovery process itself. For this, an extra field is introduced in the basic message 
AODV which helps a node for taking decision whether to make cache e
duplicated RREQ packet. Moreover, we have also suggested a new control message named 
Route REQest ACKnowledgement (RREQ
re-flooding is not available, like RREP generation.
cache. 
Where, Nb = Neighbor node address, from which either concerned duplicated RREQ or 
RREQ-ACK is received 
D = Destination node address, directly copied from the same received message for which route 
discovery process is witnessed 
T = Timestamp, again directly copied from the same received message for which route 
discovery process is witnessed 
F = Boolean Flag, indicates the activity behind the making of this entry. If 0, entry is made 
using the duplicated RREQ and if 1, entry is made using the RREQ
Ex = Expiry Time, after this timeout this entry has to be flushed
decided based on the following equation:
Ex = CURRENT_TIME + PATH_DISCOVERY_TIME
mmunications (IJCNC) Vol.4, No.4, Ju
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5.3. Control Messages of AODVSEC  
5.3.1. Route Request (RREQ)  
 
 
Figure 7. Modified Message Format of RREQ 
A = Acknowledgement Flag, if set then AODVSEC procedures have to be followed 
RREQ Timestamp = Time at which the route discovery process is initiated 
Previous Node IP Address = Node address from which node has received RREQ. It is updated 
before re-flooding. Initially, it is same as Originator IP Address. Whenever any node receives 
the duplicated RREQ, it compares its identity with the value from this field and upon matching 
does the cache entry before dropping the packet. 
5.3.2. Route Request ACKnowledgement (RREQ-ACK)  
The node(s) which will send RREP instead of further re-flooding of RREQ have to first       
generate and send it back to the node from which it has received RREQ message. 
 
 
Figure 8. Proposed Message Format for RREQ-ACK 
Type = RREQ-ACK, indentifies the packet type 
Own IP Address = IP address of message generating node 
Destination IP Address = directly copied from the received RREQ 
RREQ Timestamp = directly copied from the received RREQ 
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5.3.3. Route Reply (RREP)  
Figure 9. 
RREQ Timestamp = directly copied from the r
5.4. Validation of RREP using RREQ
It is very simple process for deciding whether incoming RREP message is to be accepted or not. 
For doing the same, one-to-one mapping is done with the
RREQ-ACK Cache. 
As shown in Figure 10, Destination IP Address from incoming RREP is matched with D field in 
the RREQ-ACK Cache. Likewise, RREQ Timestamp from RREP is matched with T field in the 
Cache. 
Figure 10. Valida
If all matches are exactly found same (i.e
cache, RREQ Timestamp from RREP with the ‘T’ field of cache and the Sending node address 
with the ‘nb’ field of cache, only 
in the same way as in AODV. 
mmunications (IJCNC) Vol.4, No.4, Ju
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5.5. Incorporation with the fundamental working of basic AODV
To implement our proposed algorithm we modify the basic functionality of AODV as follows:
• Upon receiving the RREQ (recvRequest fun
- If RREQ is duplicated then, node is supposed to compare its identity with “Previous 
Node IP Address” field in RREQ. Upon success, the concerned information is stored in 
the RREQ-ACK cache followed by the no
- If RREP is to be generated then, RREQ
the same node. 
• Upon receiving RREQ-ACK (recvRequestAck function 
from the message is stored in the RREQ
• Upon receiving RREP (recvRep
Upon success, acceptance of RREP followed by the normal pr
5.6. Fundamental route discovery process of AODVSEC
Figure 11 shows the fundamental route discovery process of AODVSEC. It is almost simila
Figure 1 of basic AODV as far as control message propagation in the ne
 
Figure 11. 
It can be seen that the nodes which generated RREP, had sent RREQ
doing the same. The RREQ-ACK Cache is created in back ground to this process just like 
routing table is handled along with the process. Whenever any RREP message is received at any 
node, it would be first validated using the previously maintained information in RREQ
Cache (as explained in Section –
RREQ-ACK Cache is updated and at the time of receiving RREP message, the same cache is 
used for validation. 
5.7. Preventing the concerned attacks using AODVSEC
With the use of already maintained RREQ
message is first validated and upon success, it would be followed by normal procedure just like 
AODV. RC, RD and RI, these three attacks are directly prevented through the validation 
because of the mismatch in timestamp and flag values in the RREQ
mmunications (IJCNC) Vol.4, No.4, Ju
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Route Discovery Process of AODVSEC 
-ACK messages 
 5.4). To summarize, at the time of RREQ message flooding, 
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blackhole attack, as explained earlier that the attacker upon receiving any of RREQ message   
responds with the fake RREP by means of forging destination sequence number and/or hop 
count fields. In this case, there is a lake of previous RREQ-ACK message from the node         
replying with RREP message and based on that there would be absence of RREQ-ACK Cache 
entry and hence the RREP sent by the blackhole would directly be discarded. 
6. METHODOLOGY OF EVALUATION 
In our evaluation, we compare the performances of AODVSEC with the existing AODV and 
SAODV using Network Simulator – 2.33 (NS-2) [15]-[18]. The details of simulation             
environment and the performance metrics are given in the following subsections. 
6.1. Simulation Environment 
At the physical and data link layer, we used the IEEE 802.11 with Two Ray Ground radio 
propagation model. We have considered the traffic of Constant Bit Rate (CBR) data packets 
over UDP at the transport layer in a rectangular field of 850m x 550m with the total number of 
15 nodes forming the ad hoc network. 
Table 1 summarizes the complete setup for the simulation. 
Table 1. Simulation Parameters. 
Parameter Value 
Simulator NS-2.33 
Simulation Area 850m X 550m 
Propagation model Two Ray Ground 
Routing Protocols AODV, SAODV, AODVSEC 
Traffic Source CBR (UDP) 
# Mobile Nodes 15 
# Connections 1 
Packet Size 512 byte 
# Malicious Nodes 0, 1, 3 
Attacks RC, RD, RI, BH 
Simulation Time 500 second 
Attacking Time 100s,  200s, 350s 
 
6.2. Performance Metrics 
In order to evaluate the performance of the concerned routing protocols, the following five   
metrics are considered: 
1. Packet Delivery Fraction (PDF): This is the ratio of the number of data packets successfully 
delivered to the destinations to those generated by sources. 
2. Normalized Routing Load (NRL): The number of routed packets transmitted per data packet 
delivered at the destination. 
3. Average Throughput (AT): It is the rate of successfully transmitted data packets in a unit 
time in the network during the simulation. 
4. Average End-to-End Delay (AED): It is defined as the average time taken by data packets to 
propagate from source to destination across the network. This includes all possible delays 
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caused by buffering during routing discovery latency, queuing at the interface queue, and   
retransmission delays at the MAC, propagation and transfer times. 
5. Jitter: It is the variation in the time between packets arriving at destination node, caused by 
network congestion, timing drift, or route changes 
7. RESULT ANALYSIS 
This section presents the simulation results for the following cases: 
7.1. Normal Case (Without any malicious Activity) 
The performance of proposed AODVSEC with respect to five different performance metrics has 
been compared with that of AODV and SAODV under normal conditions in absence of any  
malicious activity. Figure 12 and Figure 13 show the graphs of Packet Delivery Fraction,   
Normalized Routing Load versus Time. From each graph it is evident that performance of 
AODVSEC, AODV and SAODV are same. For other performance metrics namely AT, AED 
and Average Jitter also, the performance of trio turned out to the exactly same. (The graphs are 
not presented here due to space considerations).  
 
Figure 12. Packet Delivery Fraction vs. Time 
 
Figure 13. Normalized Routing Load vs. Time 
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Thus AODVSEC is simpler to implement as compared to SAODV and yields same               
performance. We simulated these protocols for an additional performance metric, Accumulated 
Average Processing Time for performing their corresponding functionalities upon receiving 
specific  control message (see Figure 14). 
 
Figure 14. Accumulated Average Processing Time vs. Protocol 
From the above Figure 14, it can be concluded that the average processing time of AODVSEC 
is little higher than that in AODV because of the working for RREQ-ACK Cache during the 
route discovery process (as explained in section 5). As SAODV applies the cryptographic   
functions upon receiving any control message to validate the same, it requires higher processing 
time leading to more energy requirement of the node in comparison to AODV and AODVSEC. 
Hence in normal condition (without any malicious activity) SAODV consumes more          
computational power of the participating mobile node whereas AODVSEC does not. 
7.2. In Presence of Resource Consumption (RC) Attack  
This subsection compares the performance evaluation of the protocols in presence of loop   
forming attack. In this specific attack, data packets are forcefully looped during its delivery to 
the ultimate destination resulting into data loss (see Figure 15). At the same time, the victim 
nodes have to participate compulsorily in forwarding duplicated data packets that results into 
the resource consumption, as well as increase in the routing overhead as well (see Figure 16). 
 
Figure 15. Packet Delivery Fraction vs. Time 
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Figure 16. Normalized Routing Load vs. Time 
From the above graphs, it can be seen that after the attack at time 200 second, performance of 
AODV drops whereas AODVSEC and SAODV do not get affected and performance of 
AODVSEC is at par as that of SAODV. 
7.3. In Presence of Route Disturb (RD) Attack  
This attack periodically tends to either break or disturb the existing route resulting into new 
route discovery procedure. As a result new route discovery process increases the routing load 
(see Figure 17), also the ultimate destination may notice increased jitter while receiving the    
actual data sent by the originator (see Figure 18). 
 
 
Figure 17. Normalized Routing Load vs. Time 
International Journal of Computer Networks & Communications (IJCNC) Vol.4, No.4, July 2012 
205 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18. Average Jitter vs. Time 
From the above Figures it is observed that – after attacking time (200s), the performance of 
AODV degrades whereas AODVSEC and SAODV mostly maintain their own normal behavior. 
7.4. In Presence of Route Invasion (RI) Attack  
In this attack, the attacker does not break the route and at the same time the packet delivery to 
the destination is not affected. Instead it invades itself into the data path so the protocol becomes 
highly vulnerable to snooping. For showing the effect of this attack we have calculated the total 
data packets received by the attacker during the whole simulation. 
 
 
Figure 19. Data Packets though Attacker vs. Time 
We can conclude from the above Figure 19 that before the attack (200s), the attacker could not 
get any data packets in any of the protocol. Once attack is launched, attacker node starts getting 
data packets under AODV whereas AODVSEC and SAODV remain aloof from the attack. 
7.5. In Presence of multiple malicious activities  
Figure 20 to Figure 23 show results with the three nodes performing the random malicious       
activities at their own specific time. We have considered a case where all the three attacks are 
launched separately by three attackers. We did RI attack at 100s followed by RC attack at 200s 
and then RD attack at 350s. 
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Figure 20. Data Packets though Attacker vs. Time 
 
Figure 21. Packet Delivery Fraction vs. Time 
Figure 20 shows that, the attacker node started receiving the data packets for AODV, but, after 
300s when RC attack has launched, it stopped getting the same as the rest of the data  packets 
were forced in the loop. AODVSEC and SAODV remained unaffected and performed normally. 
AODV gets worst affected due to RC attack leading to seizable drop in PDF (Figure 21). 
 
Figure 22. Normalized Routing Load vs. Time 
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Figure 23. Accumulated Average Processing Time vs. Protocol 
Figure 22 shows the performance of NRL in which AODV is comparatively less affected during 
RC attack than during RD attack (after 350s). In all, AODVSEC and SAODV secure          
themselves from the attacks. Figure 23 shows the accumulated average processing time of all 
three protocols in the presences of all three attacks and from this graph it can be concluded that 
AODVSEC utilizes quite less processing time and ultimately less computational power as   
compared to SAODV. 
7.6. In Presence of Blackhole Attack  
Figure 24 shows the results with consideration of Blackhole attack. As PDF is the most affected 
and obvious performance metric we have shown the comparison of all three protocols for this 
parameter. 
 
  
 
Figure 24. Packet Delivery Fraction vs. Time 
It is obvious from the above Figure that AODV fails to transfer any of the sent data packets to 
the intended destination, whereas AODVSEC and SAODV do not get affected at all by the      
blackhole attack.  
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8. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK 
We have modified the fundamental route discovery process of basic AODV in such a way that 
the protocol can mitigate the effects of active forge attacks viz. Resource Consumption (RC)   
attack, Route Disturb (RD) attack and Route Invasion (RI) attack through fake RREP message. 
To provide the security provision, we have not used much complex processing                        
e.g. Cryptography Functions or any logic that further requires the central trusted authority. We 
have compared AODVSEC with the existing AODV and SADOV protocol. Our results show 
that the performance of AODVSEC is no less than that of SAODV but the same is achieved 
with lower processing requirement leading to lots of saving of computational power. 
Our future work will focus on security aspects for the attacks that can be launched through  
forging the RREQ control message. AODVSEC is currently applicable in the scenario where 
there is presence of the active forge reply based attacks. In all as of now, AODVSEC gives 
similar results like SAODV and that is with the all important computational power saving       
although it is attacking condition based on the fake RREP messages. 
 
REFERENCES 
[1] S. Corson and J. Macker. “Mobile Ad Hoc Networking (MANET): Routing Protocol Perform-
ance Issues and Evaluation Consideration”, available at  
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2501.txt 
[2] RFC3561 (AODV). 2003; http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3561.txt  
[3] N.Ch.sriman, Syed Mohammed Ansar, Sachin Kumar and Piyush Nagas “An Efficient and Se-
cure Routing Protocol for Mobile Ad-hoc Networks”, IJCNC, Volume 2, No.3, May 2010. 
[4] Perkins, C. E. and Bhagwat, P. 1994. Highly Dynamic destination-sequenced distance-vector 
routing (DSDV). For mobile computers. 
[5] RFC3636. 2003. T. Clausen, Ed., P. Jacquet, Ed. Project Hipercom, INRIA. 
[6] Aggarwa,l A., Gandhi, S. and Chaubey, N. 2011. Performance Analysis of AODV, DSDV and 
DSR in MANETs. Page No. 167-177 in International Journal of Distributed and Parallel Systems 
(IJDPS) ISSN: 0976 - 9757 [Online] ; 2229 - 3957 [Print] Vol.2, No.. 
[7] Gandhi, S., Chaubey, N., Tada, N. and Trivedi, S. 2012. Scenario-based Performance Compari-
son of Reactive, Proactive & Hybrid Protocols in MANET. In 2nd IEEE International Confer-
ence on Computer Communication and Informatics (ICCCI-2012), 10-12, January; 
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/freeabs_all.jsp?arnumber=6158842  
[8] Gandhi, S., Chaubey, N., Shah, P. and Sadhwani, M. 2012. Performance Evaluation of DSR, 
OLSR and ZRP Protocols in MANETs. In 2nd IEEE International Conference on Computer 
Communication and Informatics (ICCCI-2012), 10-12, January, 2012 being held at Sri Shakthi 
Institute of Engineering and Technology, Coimbatore, Tamilnadu, India; 
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/freeabs_all.jsp?arnumber=6158841  
[9] Ning, P., Sun, K. 2005. How to Misue AODV - A Case Study of Insider Attacks against 
MANET Routing. In Ad Hoc Networks, Volume 3, Issue 6, Pages 795–819; Elsevier; 
http://discovery.csc.ncsu.edu/pubs/TRMisuseAODV.pdf  
[10] Zapata, M. and Asokan, N. 2002. Securing Ad-hoc Routing Protocols. In Proceedin. of ACM 
Workshop on Wireless Security (WiSe), Atlanta, GA. 
[11] Sanzgiti, K., Dahill, B., Neil Levine, B., Shields, K., Elizabeth, M., Belding-Royer. 2002. A se-
cure Routing Protocol for Ad hoc networks. In Proceedings of the 10th IEEE International Con-
ference on Network Protocols. 
International Journal of Computer Networks & Communications (IJCNC) Vol.4, No.4, July 2012 
209 
 
 
 
[12] Yi, P. Naldurg, and R. Kravets. 2001. Security-Aware Ad hoc Routing for Wireless Networks. In 
proceedings 2nd ACM Symp. Mobile Ad hoc Networking and Computing (Mobihoc’01), Long 
Beach, CA, pp. 299-302. 
[13] Payal N. Raj, Prashant B. Swadas(2009), ” DPRAODV: A DYANAMIC LEARNING SYSTEM 
AGAINST BLACKHOLE ATTACK IN AODV BASED MANET”, Proceedings of  IJCSI In-
ternational Journal of Computer Science Issues, Vol. 2, 2009 
[14] Amol A.Bhosle, Tushar P. Thosar, Snehal Mehatre,” Black-Hole and Wormhole Attack in Rout-
ing Protocol AODV in MANET” Proceedings of  IJCSEA, Vol.2,No.1, February 2012. 
[15] NS-2 Network simulator; http://www.isi.edu/nsnam/ns/  
[16] http://www.ece.ubc.ca/~teerawat/NS2.htm  
[17] Network Simulator - 2 (NS-2); http://mohit.ueuo.com/NS-2.html  
[18] Marc Greis’ Tutorial for the UCB/LBNL/VINT Network Simulator “ns”; 
http://www.isi.edu/nsnam/ns/tutorial/  
 
Authors 
Akshai Aggarwal (MIEEE’1966, SMIEEE’1992, LMIEEE 2011) is working as 
Vice Chancellor, Gujarat Technological University, Ahmedabad, India. Before 
joining as the Vice-Chancellor, he was working as the Director of School of 
Computer Science, University of Windsor, Canada. He worked as Professor and 
Head of Department of Computer Science at Gujarat University for about 10 
years. Before that he was Professor and Head, Department of EE at 
M.S.University of Baroda. He was Chairman of IEEE India Council for two 
years. He initiated IEEE activities in Gujarat by starting the first IEEE Student 
Branch at M.S.University of Baroda. Later he initiated the establishment of the Student Branch at Gujarat 
University. He was also the founder Chairman of IEEE Gujarat Section, the IEEE Computer Society  
Chapter and the IEEE Joint Chapter of Industry Applications, Industrial Electronics and Power Electron-
ics. The Section conducted two International Conferences and one national Seminar during his Chair-
manship. He graduated with a B.Sc.(EE) from Punjab Engg College and studied at MS University of 
Baroda for his Master’s and Doctoral work.  
 
Savita Gandhi (MIEEE’ 2003 SMIEEE’ 2005) is Professor & Head at the       
Department of Computer Science, Gujarat University and Joint Director, K.S. 
School of Business Management, Gujarat University. She is with Gujarat      Uni-
versity for about 24 years. Before that she has worked with M.S. University of 
Baroda, Department of Mathematics for about 10 years. She has been actively    
associated with IEEE activities at Gujarat Section. She is M.Sc. (Mathematics), 
Ph.D (Mathematics) and A.A.S.I.(Associate Member of Actuarial Society of    
India by the virtue of having completed the "A" group examinations comprising six subjects conducted 
by       Institute of Actuaries , London). She was awarded Gold Medal for standing first class first secur-
ing 93% marks in M.Sc. and several prizes at M.Sc. as well as B.Sc. Examinations for obtaining highest 
marks.  
 
Nirbhay Chaubey (SIEEE’ 2002 MIEEE’ 2004) pursuing his Ph.D (Computer 
Science) at Department of Computer Science, Gujarat University, Ahmedabad, 
India and working as an Assistant Professor of Computer Science at Institute of 
Science and Technology for Advanced Studies and Research, Vallabh Vidyana-
gar, Gujarat, India. He has been involved in IEEE activities since 1994. His po-
sition held for IEEE Gujarat Section include Executive Secretary (1998-2005), 
Treasurer (2005-2006), Secretary and Treasurer (2007) and  Treasurer for year 
2008 onwards. He graduated from Ranchi University, Ranchi, and Master in Computer Applications from 
Madurai Kamraj University, Madurai, India. 
 
International Journal of Computer Networks & Communications (IJCNC) Vol.4, No.4, July 2012 
210 
 
 
 
 
Pathik Shah received his graduation degree for B.E. (Electronics & Communica-
tions Engineering) from Gujarat University, Ahmedabad, Gujarat, India in 2010. 
Currently he is a student at Department of Computer Science,   Gujarat Univer-
sity for completing his study of post graduation degree in M.Tech. (Networking 
& Communications). He opted the domain of Security Concerns in Mobile Ad 
hoc Networks for his Dissertation work towards the current professional degree.  
 
Madhvi Sadhwani received her graduation degree for B.E. (Information    Tech-
nology) from Dharmsinh Desai University, Nadiad, Gujarat, India in 2008. Cur-
rently she is a student at Department of Computer Science, Gujarat          Univer-
sity for completing her study of post graduation degree in M.Tech.    (Networking 
& Communications). She opted the domain of Security Concerns in Mobile Ad 
hoc Networks for her Dissertation work towards the current professional degree.  
